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Introduction
“Cancer is down to ‘bad luck not lifestyle’. Experts claim
65 per cent of cases are random”1—the headline in the
British tabloid newspaper, the Daily Express—was typical
of the extensive media coverage of a Science paper,2 pub-
lished in 2015, that related the lifetime risk of particular
types of cancer in the USA to the number of stem cell div-
isions occurring in the tissues from which these cancers
arise. ‘The majority of cancer cases are down to sheer bad
luck, rather than unhealthy lifestyle, poor diet or even in-
herited genes, according to a new study,’1 the story contin-
ued. ‘All cancers are caused by a combination of bad luck,
the environment and heredity, and we’ve created a model
that may help quantify how much these three factors con-
tribute to cancer development’,3 Bert Vogelstein, the senior
author and a leading cancer researcher, said. The
Guardian’s Owen Jones found it ‘liberating’ that ‘the major-
ity of cancers are down to chance’.4 Lifestyle, environment
and heritable genetic variation had all been over-played as
contributors to cancer risk, it was agreed, and screening,
early detection and treatment were the way to go.
These bold and confident conclusions cannot be attrib-
uted to the simplifications of over-enthusiastic journalists,
as some have attempted to do.5 A Time magazine article
produced a graphic representation of the types of cancer
that could be categorized as due to ‘bad luck’ in contrast to
those that could be considered as attributable to ‘bad luck
plus environmental and inherited factors’ (Figure 1).6
In Science itself, the sub-heading of the In Depth commen-
tary7 on the paper was ‘analysis suggests most cases can’t
be prevented’, and readers were told that ‘the average can-
cer patient . . . is just unlucky’, and that ‘cancer. . . often
cannot be prevented, and more resources should be fun-
nelled into catching it in its infancy’. The media coverage
simply reported what the journal and the authors had
stated.
As is often the case, the conclusions from a single study
were not viewed against the background of the broader sci-
entific literature and established facts. Stark discrepancies be-
tween the interpretations of this one study and evidence of
the potential preventability of cancer emerge in this light.
The starting point here are epidemiological data on vari-
ations in cancer risk over time and between different places
and how cancer rates change upon migration. Clearly
changes in luck cannot lead to dramatic increases or de-
creases in cancer rates over time, or large differences in risk
between different countries. Yet this is precisely what is seen.
Lung cancer was a medical rarity in the early 20th cen-
tury in the USA, representing less than 1% of all cancer
cases in a 1914 report of over 50 000 cases from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census. By contrast, stomach cancers ac-
counted for over 20% of all cancer cases. Lung cancer
rates increased by orders of magnitude as a consequence
of the adoption of cigarette smoking, whereas stomach
cancer rates declined dramatically across the 20th century
(Figure 2).8 The reduction in stomach cancer rates was a
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likely consequence of equally marked reductions in infec-
tion by the bacteria H pylori, a probable partial conse-
quence of the introduction of the domestic refrigerator in
the early part of the 20th century (Figure 3), together with
other factors leading to decreases in faecal-oral transmis-
sion of bacterial infection in infancy and childhood.9
Similar malleability of risk is indicated by the large dif-
ferences in rates of cancer across countries (Figure 4),10
Figure 1. Cancers attributed to bad luck in popular media coverage6 of the Tomsetti and Vogelstein paper2.
VC 2013 Elizabeth Cook.
Figure 2. Trends in age-adjusted cancer death rates* by site, males, USA, 1930–2012.
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with risk also changing with migration between countries.
These basic approaches of establishing time trends, geo-
graphical differences and the influence of migration on
cancer risk cannot be due to chance or luck—or direct gen-
etic effects, for that matter. Contrasts between rates in
low- and high-risk populations set a benchmark for the de-
gree to which environmental influences are causing a par-
ticular cancer, and what is preventable in principle.
In their 1981 report on the causes of cancer,11 Richard
Doll and Richard Peto provided an estimate of the propor-
tion of cancers that could be theoretically avoided by com-
paring rates in Connecticut (an established US cancer
registry) for each cancer site, with the lowest rates found in
a reputable cancer registry elsewhere (published in the
1976 version of the third edition of the IARC publication
Cancer Incidence in Five Continents, covering the period
around 1967–71).12 For example, the lowest liver cancer
or melanoma rates at that time were observed in the UK,
and the lowest lung cancer rates in Nigeria. Doll and Peto
concluded that 75–80% of cancers are likely to be avoid-
able, although this statistic could be higher. Conducting a
similar exercise now, based on registry data from 2003 to
2007 and comparing the Connecticut cancer registry data
with the lowest fifth percentile of other cancer registries,
provides a broadly similar result (79% of female and 83%
of male cancers being avoidable). One could select the
Figure 3. Infection reduction through refrigeration? A newspaper advertisement from the early 20th century might have been correct in its claims re-
garding the effect of refrigeration on infant infection (and infant mortality), with consequent reductions in stomach cancer many decades later, reflect-
ing the protection against early life infection by H. pylori provided by such innovations.
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lowest recorded incidence rate for each cancer site for this
calculation (i.e. below the fifth percentile), although the
message will remain similar. The vast majority of cancers
are caused by modifiable exposures (some known, some
not) and are not simply down to bad luck.
What can be leading to the mismatch between the ap-
parent conclusions of the Science study and this well-
established evidence of the modifiability of cancer risk?
Considering that the role of luck in cancer has been widely
recognized and discussed for decades, why did it re-
emerge? Ironically, almost exactly the same conclusions as
were given by Tomasseti and Vogelstein had been reached
by William Cramer 80 years previously, when he wrote in
the Lancet that ‘the reason why cancer appears to be a
mysterious disease is its apparently capricious incidence: in
the majority of cases we do not know why one individual
develops cancer and another remains free from it, although
living under apparently the same conditions. Our ignor-
ance on this point makes it impossible to prevent the dis-
ease’.13 Responding to Cramer, J. P. Lockhart-Mummery
wrote ‘. . .the chances of being able to prevent cancer. . . is
not a very hopeful one. . . however. . . if individuals are
carefully examined at regular intervals, there is an
excellent chance that they should be detected at an early
stage, when it is curable’,14 echoing the conclusions drawn
eight decades later on the basis of the Tomasetti and
Vogelstein paper, regarding the apparent need to divert re-
sources from prevention to early detection.2,7
In reality, over these 80 years there had emerged a gen-
eral (although clearly not universally appreciated) under-
standing that there is actually no mismatch between a high
proportion of cancer cases being preventable in principle,
whereas at an individual level cases appear sporadic, to the
extent of being apparently quasi-random.15
What was known before this study?
The large majority of cancer cases arise from tissues that
undergo cell divisions throughout life, in particular from
epithelial tissues. Epithelium covers the external surface of
organs that are linked directly to the external world
(e.g. skin, intestinal linings, bronchi in the lungs, the cer-
vix) or internal surfaces of ducts and tracts with a less dir-
ect link to the outside environment (e.g. breast ducts,
prostatic ducts, the bladder, ovary, pancreas, etc.). Thus
the common cancers—which contribute most to the overall
Figure 4. Rates of cancer across high-quality cancer registries across the world. From Bray et al. (2015).10
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burden of cancer—including lung, breast, prostate, colon,
cervix and skin—are epithelial. Interestingly, it is epithelial
cancers that tend to show most geographical and temporal
variation in their occurrence, implicating environmental
influences in their aetiology.
There are many generally rare cancers arising from non-
epithelial tissues (leukaemia and sarcomas are examples),
but these contribute a much smaller proportion of all can-
cer cases in a population, generally less than 10%. The lat-
ter class of cancers includes several types seen in infancy
and childhood, which generally arise while the tissues are
still dividing during early (particularly fetal) growth and
development.16 The fact that cancers preferentially arise
from tissues in which cell divisions occur frequently has
been widely recognized for many decades, and was elo-
quently discussed by Richard Peto in an insightful paper
from 40 years ago17 which we reprint (for the first time
without a series of omissions and errors) in this issue of the
IJE.18 However, from a public health perspective the key
issue relates not to which cancers are more common or
rare, but rather to what is the overall burden of cancer,
how much of this is preventable in principle, and how
much with current knowledge? The difference between the
two is an indicator of the need for further research to iden-
tify causes of cancer modifiable at the population level
(Box 1).
The place of chance, luck or stochasticity in the risk of
cancer for any particular individual is widely recognized.
One obvious indicator of this relates to cancer in bilateral
organs, for example breast or testicular cancer, following a
sporadic initial case. Both of a pair of organs share germ-
line genetic make-up and will have experienced almost
identical environments (for example, being exposed to the
consequences of diet, smoking, occupation and environ-
ment). Yet the risk of cancer arising in the contralateral
breast or testicle, although raised over the background
level, is not dramatically elevated. What can have contrib-
uted to one breast or testicle, and not the other, having de-
veloped cancer? Some process that we may as well call
chance or luck is likely to have been involved.
The distinction between chance at the individual level
and modifiable risk at the population level can be illus-
trated with a simple thought experiment. Take two geo-
graphically distinct but demographically similar cities—
Lyon and Bristol, for example—and imagine that in Lyon
every adult without exception was made to smoke 20 cig-
arettes a day, whereas in Bristol no one was allowed to
smoke a single cigarette. Over the subsequent 50 years, the
incidence of lung cancer in Lyon would increase greatly
and would become very considerably higher than in
Bristol. However within Lyon, where everyone was a
smoker, only a proportion of the population would
develop lung cancer, and both those who did and those
who did not acquire lung cancer would have smoked
exactly the same amount. Within Lyon luck would be a
major contributor to which individuals developed lung
cancer, but between Lyon and Bristol essentially every add-
itional case could be attributed to smoking, and would
have been preventable. In this setting, at the individual
level chance plays a major role in deciding who does or
does not get cancer, but this does not detract from the
major modifiable exposure, smoking in this instance, being
responsible for virtually every case of the disease.15
This notion of modifiable exposures coupled with
individual-level chance in the context of lung cancer is articu-
lated lucidly in a letter from Richard Peto, published in the
New Scientist in 1977 (Box 2). In the case of Johannes
Heesters, luck was clearly on his side; after what photo-
graphic evidence suggests was a lifelong exposure to cigarette
smoking (Box 3), he did not succumb to lung cancer. At the
age of 106 he chose to quit smoking for his then 61-year-old
wife, reputedly stating that this was so ‘she should have me
as long as possible’.19 Such anecdotes abound, underscoring
the role of luck and chance implicit in each individual case of
cancer. Importantly, this does not mean that cancer preven-
tion at a population level is implausible.
When is ‘environment’ not environment?
The Tomasetti and Vogelstein paper attracted both consid-
erable media attention and considerable academic reac-
tion. 20,21,22,23,24,25 Whilst must of the latter was astute
there have also been examples of similar, but mirror-
image, misunderstandings of the levels of explanation
required to reconcile chance at the individual level and
causal explanation at the population level. We will con-
sider one example, Stephen Rappaport’s paper entitled
‘Genetic factors are not the major causes of chronic dis-
eases’.26 This focused on germline genetic variation, rather
than the somatic mutations consequent on cell division
that we have discussed so far. The major contribution in
twin studies of the so-called ‘non-shared environment’ to
variance in cancer risk was noted, and then this (large)
component of variance—which incorporates both the main
effects of so-called ‘non-shared environment’ (NSE) and
the interaction between genetic influences and NSE—was
converted into a population-attributable risk fraction,
shown to be large for virtually all conditions. This appears
to make a strong case for the environmental causes of can-
cer, but is predicated on the notion that NSE—those fac-
tors that lead monozygotic twins with shared germline
genomes and shared early life (and many later life) environ-
mental experiences to be different—can be meaningfully
termed ‘environment’. It is, indeed, likely that stochastic
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processes—including somatic mutations, mitotically stable
epigenetic events and chance life history incidents that
could not be meaningfully targeted in disease prevention—
make up a major component of the NSE.15 It is unfortu-
nate that the terminology of the ‘non-shared environment’,
introduced by behavioural geneticists, should be allowed
to mislead epidemiology. A (much) longer statement of this
is available elsewhere;15 its author now wishes he had
replaced the incomprehensible title ‘Epidemiology, epigen-
etics and the ‘Gloomy Prospect’: embracing randomness in
Box 1 Cancer: preventability in principle and preventability in practice.
An issue which, in the UK, influenced the reporting of the Tomasetti and Vogelstein paper was that around the same
time in late 2015 a Cancer Research UK (CRUK) report was released saying that, with current knowledge, 4 out of 10
cancers could be prevented. This was looking at preventability in practice rather than preventability in principle, which
was (misleadingly) addressed by the Tomasetti and Vogelstein paper.2 Many similar estimates (of around 40%) have
been provided, for example by Parkin et al.39 The similarity of the 4 in 10 and the one-third figure for what could be
‘prevented’ led to these being conflated in reports, apparently supporting each other, whereas preventability in principle
and what can now be prevented are very different things.
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population health research and practice’ with the simpler
‘Non-shared environment is (probably) not environment’.
Whilst aiming to accentuate the importance of environ-
ment is laudable in public health terms, it is probably
counter-productive in terms of intervening to improve
population health, since it simply denies the reliable per-
ception the public have about influences on disease risk at
the individual level.15,27,28
Can we harness chance to inform us about
the causes of cancer?
Chance is a fundamental part of our biology and can in
fact be harnessed to provide insight into the modifiable
causes of cancer. The random (chance) assortment of genes
at conception—which Richard Peto discusses in his let-
ter—is one foundation of the Mendelian randomization
approach which allows us to use genes as unconfounded,
unbiased proxies of environmentally modifiable exposures
(such as smoking, alcohol intake and various dietary fac-
tors) and strengthen causal inference about the roles these
exposures play in cancer risk.29,30 There are an increasing
number of examples of the application31 of this method in
cancer research,31,32,33,34 including several papers in this
issue of the IJE.35,36,37,38 However, it is important to note
in this context too, that the evidence generated should be
interpreted at the group level only, and ultimately tells us
little about whether one individual will develop cancer
whereas their contemporary will not.
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Box 2 A letter to the New Scientist from Richard Peto commenting on the role of chance in cancer40
Cancer risk
Sir,—It is a common misconception that because many smokers do not develop lung cancer there must be constitu-
tional or environmental reasons why they do not. This misconception appears both in Monitor (9 December 1976, p
586) and in CB Goodhart’s reply (Letters, 3 February, p 294).
Several different heritable changes are probably all needed to alter a normal epithelial cell sufficiently for it to be able
to proliferate unlimitedly and act as the progenitor of a carcinoma.
These separate changes are occurring from time to time in one cell or another at one place or another in the lung epi-
thelium, and they are largely irreversible in the sense that when a cell that has suffered one or more of them divides,
two similarly changed daughter cells will result.
The essential role of luck in the process of cancer induction follows if we assume that to get cancer two (or more) such
changes must coincide in one cell. Even in AD 3000 when all the details of cellular susceptibility and environmental
and metabolic peculiarity have been elucidated, a complete and full description of the process of cancer induction will
still require that good and bad luck be invoked to explain why my brother got cancer and I did not.
(One of his changes hit a cell, which, having already suffered the other necessary change years earlier, thereby pro-
gressed towards malignancy, while in me that second change hit the cell adjacent to a previously changed cell and was
therefore irrelevant. Apart from that one unfortunate event, the number of previously changed cells scattered around
my lungs and elsewhere in his lungs are pretty much the same, but I was lucky and he was not.)
Of course, we must try to discover why some people get cancer and others do not; we will thereby discover that smokers
are more liable to lung cancer, and how the smoker’s risk varies with the duration and style of smoking; we may well
also discover roles for aryl hydrocarbon hydroxylases, benzopyrene binding factors, vitamin A deficiencies, and so on.
All this will advance our scientific understanding, but when our scientific understanding is as advanced as possible
there will still be unexplained stochastic variation which it will be scientifically worthless to investigate, in exactly the
sense that it would be scientifically worthless to ask, once the molecular basis of Mendel’s laws is properly understood,
what was the reason why a particular child born to two parents each with one recessive gene for red hair did not, in
fact, have red hair. He was just lucky.
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